Becoming Minded

A central claim of physicalist illusionism is that meta-cognition involves a person applying theory of mind to themselves after the fact, rather than having direct introspective access. This argument is supported by evidence from cognitive development and philosophy of consciousness. The chapter examines how children acquire theory of mind and debates whether there is an asymmetry between attributing mental states to oneself versus others. It also discusses how the transparency of perception relates to the kind of illusionism required by Buddhist physicalism, particularly regarding how meta-cognition is possible.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract This chapter presents evidence from empirical research on cognitive development, as well as from philosophy of consciousness, for a central claim of a physicalist illusionism: that meta-cognition involves the subject’s post-hoc application of theory of mind to their own case. It explores recent work on the child’s acquisition of theory of mind, and the debate concerning whether there is an asymmetry between the child’s mastery of first-person and third-person attribution of mental states. The consequences of this debate for an account of meta-cognition are explored. Recent accounts of the notion of the transparency of perception are also shown to be relevant to the sort of illusionism that would be required by a Buddhist physicalism, insofar as they have direct bearing on the question of how meta-cognition is possible.