Signal detection theory, the exclusion failure paradigm and weak consciousness--evidence for the access/phenomenal distinction?
Consciousness and cognition June 1, 2009 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.11.002 via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA critique argues that claims by Block and Snodgrass about phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness, based on signal detection theory analysis of qualitative difference paradigms like exclusion failure, are unwarranted. Partial cognitive access, not a total lack, can explain exclusion failure results. Snodgrass's Objective Threshold/Strategic model relies on a problematic 'enable' approach that denies intentional control of unconscious perception and effects of task instructions on phenomenal consciousness. Many of Block's examples also depend on this approach. Qualitative difference paradigms may index only a subset of access consciousness, so they cannot isolate phenomenal consciousness, and attempts to do so face serious methodological problems.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 10 |
| Key finding | Qualitative difference paradigms like exclusion failure cannot be used to isolate phenomenal consciousness from access consciousness, and attempts to do so face serious methodological problems. |
Abstract
Block [Block, N. (2005). Two neural correlates of consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Science, 9, 46-52] and Snodgrass (2006) claim that a signal detection theory (SDT) analysis of qualitative difference paradigms, in particular the exclusion failure paradigm, reveals cases of phenomenal consciousness without access consciousness. This claim is unwarranted on several grounds. First, partial cognitive access rather than a total lack of cognitive access can account for exclusion failure results. Second, Snodgrass's Objective Threshold/Strategic (OT/S) model of perception relies on a problematic 'enable' approach to perception that denies the possibility of intentional control of unconscious perception and any effect of following different task instructions on the presence/absence of phenomenal consciousness. Many of Block's purported examples of phenomenal consciousness without cognitive access also rely on this problematic approach. Third, qualitative difference paradigms may index only a subset of access consciousness. Thus, qualitative difference paradigms like exclusion failure cannot be used to isolate phenomenal consciousness, any attempt to do so still faces serious methodological problems.