The irrelevance of folk intuitions to the "hard problem" of consciousness.

Folk intuitions about mental states, often used by philosophers to study qualia and phenomenal consciousness, do not actually provide reliable data about these subjects. The paper argues that judgments in experiments by Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery are likely produced by a fast, automatic cognitive system (System One) that would yield the same results regardless of whether phenomenal consciousness exists. This undermines much current experimental philosophy research into consciousness. To meaningfully investigate phenomenal consciousness, experimental philosophy must be grounded in a better understanding of how people make judgments.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Recently, a number of philosophers have turned to folk intuitions about mental states for data about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. In this paper I argue that current research along these lines does not tell us about these subjects. I focus on a series of studies, performed by Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery, to make my argument. Folk judgments studied by these researchers are mostly likely generated by a certain cognitive system - System One - that will generate the same data whether or not we experience phenomenal consciousness. This is a problem for a range of current experimental philosophy research into consciousness or our concept of it. If experimental philosophy is to shed light into phenomenal consciousness, it needs to be better founded in an understanding of how we make judgments.