The interplay of attention and consciousness in visual search, attentional blink and working memory consolidation.

A unified neurocognitive theory, the theory of attention and consciousness (TAC), bridges separate accounts of consciousness and visual attention. TAC extends the global neuronal workspace model to a visual attentional workspace (VAW) controlled by executive routers, eliminating the need for explicit saliency maps. It explains phenomena including the attentional blink, working memory consolidation, illusory conjunctions, inattentional blindness, and working memory capacity. The theory proposes multiple processing stages between early visual representation and conscious access, suggests neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness, and reconciles all-or-none with graded views of conscious representation.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Despite the acknowledged relationship between consciousness and attention, theories of the two have mostly been developed separately. Moreover, these theories have independently attempted to explain phenomena in which both are likely to interact, such as the attentional blink (AB) and working memory (WM) consolidation. Here, we make an effort to bridge the gap between, on the one hand, a theory of consciousness based on the notion of global workspace (GW) and, on the other, a synthesis of theories of visual attention. We offer a theory of attention and consciousness (TAC) that provides a unified neurocognitive account of several phenomena associated with visual search, AB and WM consolidation. TAC assumes multiple processing stages between early visual representation and conscious access, and extends the dynamics of the global neuronal workspace model to a visual attentional workspace (VAW). The VAW is controlled by executive routers, higher-order representations of executive operations in the GW, without the need for explicit saliency or priority maps. TAC leads to newly proposed mechanisms for illusory conjunctions, AB, inattentional blindness and WM capacity, and suggests neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness. Finally, the theory reconciles the all-or-none and graded perspectives on conscious representation.