Consciousness at sea.

Evolutionary explanations of consciousness face three interconnected challenges: lingering misconceptions from evolutionary progressivism and adaptationism; the measurement problem of gathering comparative data on consciousness without an agreed-upon theory or meta-strategies; and unresolved questions about how to individuate traits for functional analysis. These challenges are illustrated through adaptive accounts that identify valence (the goodness or badness of psychological states), rather than phenomenal consciousness (the subjective experience of 'what it is like'), as the fitness-conferring trait. On such accounts, phenomenal consciousness is adaptive only if it and valence are part of the same trait; otherwise, it appears to be a byproduct of selection for valence. Whether they are part of the same trait depends on how traits are individuated and the relationship between valence and phenomenal consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This essay articulates three distinct but interrelated challenges facing evolutionary explanations of consciousness. These are: (i) lingering misconceptions about evolutionary explanations that stem from evolutionary progressivism and adaptationism; (ii) the 'measurement problem,' or the challenge of gathering comparative data on consciousness, as required by any evolutionary accounts, in the absence of not just a theory of consciousness but uncontroversial meta-strategies for coping without such theory; and (iii) unresolved bio-theoretical challenges about how best to individuate traits for the purpose of functional analysis. The effects of these challenges are then illustrated by looking at adaptive accounts of consciousness that pick out valence (provisionally, the goodness or badness of psychological states) rather than phenomenal consciousness (p-consciousness, or the 'something it is like of experience') as the fitness-conferring character. On these accounts, p-consciousness is adaptive only if valence and p-consciousness are parts of the same trait; otherwise, p-consciousness appears to be a byproduct of selection for valence. Whether p-consciousness and valence are part of the same trait in turn depends on how traits are individuated and the relationships between valence and p-consciousness.This article is part of the theme issue 'Evolutionary functions of consciousness'.