Commentary on Dan Arnold, Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind
November 15, 2017 DOI: 10.31231/osf.io/aj6p5_v1 via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis commentary engages with Dan Arnold's book, which examines the problem of intentionality—the aboutness of mental states—as it appears in classical Buddhist philosophy and contemporary cognitive science. The author discusses Arnold's argument that Buddhist thinkers, particularly Dharmakīrti, offer a distinctive perspective on intentionality that challenges reductive physicalist accounts in modern philosophy of mind. The commentary explores how taking Buddhist philosophy of mind seriously can illuminate debates about mental representation, causation, and the nature of belief, suggesting that cross-cultural philosophical dialogue enriches our understanding of these foundational issues.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Commentary |
|---|---|
| Topics | Buddhism Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Intentionality Psychology Epistemology |
| Key finding | The commentary supports Arnold's contention that classical Buddhist philosophy provides a substantive and challenging alternative to cognitive-scientific accounts of intentionality. |
Abstract
This paper is a commentary on Dan Arnold's book, Brains, Buddhas, and Believing: The Problem of Intentionality in Classical Buddhist and Cognitive-Scientific Philosophy of Mind, presented at the Toshide Numata Book Prize Symposium, "Taking Buddhist Philosophy of Mind Seriously," University of California, Berkeley, November 15, 2013.