Buddhist Philosophy of Mind: Nāgārjuna’s Critique of Mind-Body Dualism From His Rebirth Arguments
Philosophy East and West January 1, 2018 DOI: 10.1353/pew.0.0164 via OpenAlex
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractDharmakīrti, a seventh-century Indian Buddhist philosopher, is often interpreted as a mind-body dualist based on his arguments for rebirth. This paper tests that interpretation against the rival arguments of Nāgārjuna, an earlier Buddhist thinker. Nāgārjuna completely rejects both mind-body dualism and the theory of rebirth that depends on it. The paper thus challenges the dualist reading of Dharmakīrti by showing that a major Buddhist philosopher opposed such a position.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Buddhism |
| Keywords | Dualism Philosophy Argument complex analysis Mind–body problem |
| Key finding | Nāgārjuna completely rejects the mind-body dualism of Dharmakīrti and the rebirth theory built upon it. |
Abstract
Richard Hayes (1993, 2013) and Dan Arnold (2008, 2012) have argued that Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660 C.E.) is a mind-body dualist. The proof, they say, lies in the justification he gives for his theory of rebirth. In this paper, I put Dharmakīrti’s argument to the test against a rival argument of Nāgārjuna. It turns out Nāgārjuna completely rejects the mind-body dualism of Dharmakīrti and the rebirth theory built upon it.