Detecting Introspective Errors in Consciousness Science

Detecting errors in people's introspective reports about their own conscious experiences is often considered nearly impossible, posing a major challenge for consciousness science. Some researchers argue introspection should be abandoned as evidence, while others claim key questions cannot be answered empirically. The author argues these challenges can be overcome by using natural kind reasoning—iteratively applying inference to the best explanation to identify and exploit regularities in nature. This approach can detect introspective errors even in difficult cases like judgments about mental imagery. The conclusion is that worries about intractable methodological problems in consciousness science are misguided.

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Abstract

Detecting introspective errors about consciousness presents challenges that are widely supposed to be difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. This is a problem for consciousness science because many central questions turn on when and to what extent we should trust subjects’ introspective reports. This has led some authors to suggest that we should abandon introspection as a source of evidence when constructing a science of consciousness. Others have concluded that central questions in consciousness science cannot be answered via empirical investigation. I argue that on closer inspection, the challenges associated with detecting introspective errors can be overcome. I demonstrate how natural kind reasoning—the iterative application of inference to the best explanation to home in on and leverage regularities in nature—can allow us to detect introspective errors even in difficult cases such as judgments about mental imagery, and I conclude that worries about intractable methodological challenges in consciousness science are misguided.