Contemplative Practices and Soteriological Epistemology: Carrying Forward the Phenomenological Project

Contrary to Odysseus Stone and Dan Zahavi's claim that mindfulness and Phenomenology are incomparable because mindfulness focuses on experience rather than the mind-world dyad, the author argues that both traditions aim at knowledge beyond mere words. Drawing on Eugene Gendlin's experiential Phenomenology, the author contends that mindfulness, rooted in its soteriological context, cultivates a form of higher cognition (prajñā) grounded in implicit experience. This provides precise epistemic footing for philosophy, showing that recovering contemplative practice advances rather than diverges from the phenomenological project.

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Abstract

According to Odysseus Stone and Dan Zahavi’s view, canonical Phenomenology is specifically concerned with analyzing the mind-world dyad and its theoretical implications for philosophy and science. Despite widespread adoption in therapy and research, they claim that mindfulness is ambiguously described as the practice of bare attention and nonjudgment, either on perceptual objects or subjective acts. Thus, comparisons that liken Phenomenology to mindfulness are inaccurate because mindfulness is primarily concerned with how we experience the world. Furthermore, such comparisons have misconstrued Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological attitude and method of epoché and reduction, resulting in a lax usage of the term “Phenomenology.” However, I argue that within their originating soteriological milieu, meditative practices like mindfulness are no less concerned with knowledge of reality than Phenomenology. Both aim at knowledge that moves beyond mere words. Ambiguities in mindfulness discourse notwithstanding, Gendlin’s experiential Phenomenology demonstrates that we can find precise epistemic ground for philosophy in “implicit” experience—a form of knowing I liken to prajñā, or higher cognition, that practices like Buddhist mindfulness are said to cultivate. Contrary to Stone and Zahavi’s denial, drawing from Gendlin’s philosophical methodology of felt-sensing, I thus contend that recovering the contemplative element of practice in philosophical thinking cannot but carry the phenomenological project forward.