Mysticism and Its Contexts

This essay argues that philosophical analysis of mysticism can avoid the two opposing positions of mystical essentialism and mystical relativism. The author contends that recognizing the context-dependent nature of all mystical experience is compatible with both experiential novelty and the occurrence of what Ninian Smart calls the experience of consciousness-purity. The work demonstrates that it is possible to formulate a methodology that steers between these extremes, suggesting that neither position is necessary for understanding mystical experiences.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Abstract In 1983 Steven Katz thusly characterized the methodological dilemma which has come to dominate discussion of mysticism and mystical experience since the publication of his edited collection entitled Mystical Experience and Philosophical Analysis in 1978. My overall aim in this essay is to demonstrate that the philosophical analysis of mysticism is not compelled to adopt either of these apparently mutually exclusive positions and that it is possible, perhaps even necessary, to formulate a methodology which coherently steers between the Scylla of mystical essentialism, on the one hand, and the Charybdis of mystical relativism, on the other. In particular will argue that the recognition of the context- dependent nature of all mystical experience is neither incompatible with experiential novelty nor with the occurrence of what Ninian Smart labels the experience of consciousness-purity.