The epistemic innocence of psychedelic states.

The concept of 'epistemic innocence' holds that some flawed cognitive processes can still provide valuable knowledge otherwise unavailable. This idea is applied to psychedelic drugs, often dismissed as epistemically harmful due to their label 'hallucinogens'. The argument is that certain psychedelic states can be epistemically innocent, offering unique epistemic benefits despite their suboptimal nature. This conclusion has implications for psychedelic therapy policy and also refines the concept of epistemic innocence itself.

Study at a glance

Abstract

One recent development in epistemology, the philosophical study of knowledge, is the notion of 'epistemic innocence' introduced by Bortolotti and colleagues. This concept expresses the idea that certain suboptimal cognitive processes may nonetheless have epistemic (knowledge-related) benefits. The idea that delusion or confabulation may have psychological benefits is familiar enough. What is novel and interesting is the idea that such conditions may also yield significant and otherwise unavailable epistemic benefits. I apply the notion of epistemic innocence to research on the transformative potential of psychedelic drugs. The popular epithet 'hallucinogen' exemplifies a view of these substances as fundamentally epistemically detrimental. I argue that the picture is more complicated and that some psychedelic states can be epistemically innocent. This conclusion is highly relevant to policy debates about psychedelic therapy. Moreover, analysing the case of psychedelics can shed further light on the concept of epistemic innocence itself.