Experience, Dreaming, and the Phenomenology of Wakeful Consciousness

Wakeful consciousness contributes something distinctive to the stream of consciousness that is absent during non-wakeful states like dreaming. Assuming dreaming is a form of perceptual imagination, the chapter contrasts perceptual imagination when awake with that during dreaming sleep. Drawing on Brian O'Shaughnessy's ideas, it suggests that what is missing in dreaming is intentional mental action accompanied by non-inferential self-awareness. After critiquing O'Shaughnessy, the chapter proposes a 'Capacitation Thesis': wakefulness is a state of being capacitated with respect to relevant capacities. Dream imagination is then examined in light of this thesis.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This chapter works towards a better understanding of the contribution made by the state of wakeful consciousness to the stream of consciousness over time. It does this through reflection on what is missing in certain cases of non-wakeful consciousness. Granting the assumption that dreaming is a mode of perceptual imagination, the chapter contrasts perceptual imagination in the wakeful condition with perceptual imagination in dreaming sleep. It makes a suggestion about what is missing that draws on claims about the wakeful condition made by Brian O’Shaughnessy. According to this suggestion, what is missing is the occurrence of intentional mental action accompanied by non-inferential self-awareness. Building on a critique of O’Shaughnessy’s discussion, the chapter develops a ‘Capacitation Thesis’ about wakeful consciousness, according to which wakefulness is a state of being capacitated with respect to a range of relevant capacities. Imagination in the dream is discussed in the light of this thesis.