Skip to content

Psychedelics, Transformative Experience, and Modality: An Analysis of Valid and Substantially Informed Consent in Psychedelic-assisted Therapy

David Zheng

Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology September 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1353/ppp.2025.a971235

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

The article examines how psychedelic-assisted therapy (PAT) presents a unique challenge to standard notions of informed consent, building on L.A. Paul's concept of transformative experiences (TEs). The author argues that PAT qualifies as a special kind of TE because of its distinctive ineffability. Distinguishing between "valid consent" and "substantially informed consent," the author contends that whether valid consent is possible depends on whether TEs are causally necessary for PAT's therapeutic effects. Regardless, substantially informed consent is impossible for PAT because the experience's ineffability prevents meeting the materiality conditions required for informed consent.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key finding Substantially informed consent for psychedelic-assisted therapy is not possible because the transformative experience's ineffability prevents meeting the materiality conditions required for informed consent.

Abstract

abstract: Paul's concepts of "Transformative Experiences" (TE) has sparked extensive discussion on multiple epistemological and ethical issues within philosophy. In particular, Paul's work has inspired significant work on the possibility of informed consent with regard to medical interventions that may induce said TEs. One such intervention, namely Psychedelic-assisted Therapy (PAT), has been discussed at length in the psychiatric ethics literature and has posed a unique challenge to widely accepted notions of autonomy and informed consent. In the following article, I describe in detail Paul's concept of TEs and make clear why PAT deserves to be viewed as a special kind of TE due to its distinctive ineffability. I then distinguish between two different philosophical and legal versions of informed consent, including "valid consent" and "substantially informed consent" and show that whether one can provide "valid consent" for PAT depends on whether TEs are causally necessary for PAT's therapeutic effects. I argue that regardless of this causal question, "substantially informed consent" with regard to PAT is not possible due to a failure to meet the conditions of materiality necessary for informed consent.

Comments

No comments yet.

Log in to comment