ERA: The Extensional-Retentional Analysis

A new model called the Extensional-Retentional Analysis (ERA) offers a pluralistic approach to time-consciousness, arguing that extensionalist and retentionalist explanations are complementary rather than competing. ERA proposes that the duration of the specious present is best explained by the real temporal properties of experience (an inheritance view), while experiential succession is best understood through a flux of experiential relations (a relational view). Other aspects like event order are determined by the intentionality of mental processes, not directly by properties of experience. The chapter argues against a single monolithic analysis of temporal phenomenology, suggesting the phenomena are too diverse for such an approach.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This chapter proposes an alternative to the classic models of time-consciousness, called the Extensional-Retentional Analysis of temporal phenomenology, or ERA. ERA represents a pluralistic explanatory strategy as opposed to a “hybrid” view. This strategy sees extensionalism and retentionalism as not only mutually compatible, but synergistic in the sense that each is best suited to explain particular temporal phenomena. Specifically, ERA claims the duration of the specious present is best explained by appeal to the real temporal properties of experience, similar to an inheritance view of perception. Additionally, ERA claims experiential succession is best accounted for in terms of a flux of experiential relations, similar to a relational view of perception. Both of these positions take it that the temporal properties of the extended experience determine the phenomenology, and so potentially represent different understandings of extensionalism. At the same time ERA claims that other aspects of temporal phenomenology like event order are determined by the kinds of intentionality exhibited by certain relevant mental processes, and not directly by properties of experience, in a similar manner to Husserl’s retentionalism. These three sorts of explanations are aimed at quite different targets from an ontological perspective. This chapter argues there is a mistake in thinking that all aspects of temporal phenomenology are conducive to a singular monolithic analysis, when really the phenomena and the mechanisms underlying time-consciousness are too diverse in kind for such a strategy to make sense. Finally, this chapter teases the close parallels between ERA and a particular sort of implementational-level explanation, inspired by predictive approaches in cognitive science, that will be proposed in the next chapter.