The Perceptual Sense of Agency

The sense of agency—the experience of predicting, initiating, or controlling actions—appears in perceptual consciousness. This paper proposes a novel account: the perceptual sense of agency (PSoA) is underpinned by self-monitoring processes that compare sensory predictions based on motor commands with actual sensory feedback, distinguishing self-caused from other-caused perceptual changes. The PSoA is not explained by specific contents represented in perceptual experience; instead, it is modeled as a type of intentional mode that perceivers bear to contents. The account is defended against objections and contrasted with alternative views.

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Abstract

Abstract The sense of agency is the experience of predicting, initiating, or controlling actions. In this paper, I provide a novel account of the sense of agency that appears in perceptual consciousness. I follow theorists such as Bayne and Prinz in suggesting that the perceptual sense of agency (PSoA) is underpinned by self-monitoring processes. The self-monitoring mechanism compares sensory predictions, made on the basis of motor commands, with sensory feedback. This comparison process distinguishes self-caused from other-caused perceptual changes. I argue for a view where the PSoA is not explained by certain contents represented in perceptual experience. Rather, my account models the PSoA as a type of intentional mode that perceivers bear to contents. After defending this view, I respond to objections and contrast my account with others in the literature.