Fenomenologia trascendentale e cognizione incarnata. La relazione tra soggetto, corpo e mondo nel quadro di un’ontologia naturale riformata

This work compares enactivist cognitive science with classical phenomenology, focusing on Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. It argues that the relationship between subject, body, and world, along with action's mediating role, supports a dynamic conception of cognition. The transcendental perspective of embodied subjectivity shows continuity among action, perception, and higher cognition, challenging mind-body duality. The text also critiques physicalist naturalism, advocating for a weak naturalism compatible with a transcendental view that grounds subjectivity in an embodied biological organism. An ontology of nature, inspired by Merleau-Ponty, emphasizes qualitative aspects of the “flesh” and overcomes limitations in Husserl's approach.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This contribution offers a comparison between enactivist cognitive science and classical phenomenology, with a particular focus on key figures such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Two central issues are explored: the relationship between subject, body, and world, and the mediating role of action within a dynamic conception of cognition. The transcendental perspective emerging from incarnate subjectivity emphasizes the continuity between action, perception, and higher cognitive functions, challenging the mind-body duality in favor of a unified and continuous phenomenological experience. The second issue addresses physicalist naturalism and the need to move beyond mechanistic assumptions, proposing a weak naturalism that remains compatible with a transcendental perspective, one that grounds subjectivity in an embodied biological organism. An ontology of nature, inspired by Merleau-Ponty, is explored, emphasizing the qualitative aspects of the “flesh” and overcoming the limitations inherent in Husserl’s approach.