Time, Intentionality, and a Neurophenomenology of the Dot

This paper argues that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology has a systematic bias favoring intuition of essences of meaning over intuition of essences of sensation, a bias rooted in his mind-body dualism. It proposes a neurophenomenology from a biogenetic structural perspective that merges knowledge of essences from contemplation with knowledge of experience from neuroanthropology. The author describes the sensorium and the constituent element of perception, the dot, hypothesizing that experience arises from dialogue between prefrontal cortical processes and sensorial processes, with experience constituted within a field of dots arising and dissolving in temporal frames. Husserl's view of time phenomenology is deemed essentially correct and compatible with neurophysiology, modern science, and religious traditions encountered by ethnographers.

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Abstract

The purposes of this paper are twofold: first, I wish to correct a systematic bias in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. This bias is in favor of intuition of essences of meaning and against the intuition of essences of sensation. This bias is explained as a product of Husserl's mind‐body dualism. Second, I suggest the possibility of a neurophenomenology from a biogenetic structural point of view. This neurophenomenology merges the knowledge of essences derived from mature contemplation with knowledge of the structures of experience derived from neuroanthropology. After addressing these two issues I proceed to describe the sensorium from a neurophenomenological perspective, and the constituent element of perception, the dot. I hypothesize fat experience arises in the dialogue between prefrontal cortical processes and sensorial processes, that experience is constituted within a field of sensorial dots that arise and dissolve in temporal frames. I conclude that Husserl's view of the phenomenology of time is essentially correct and is both in keeping with findings from current neurophysiology, and amenable to a modem scientific view of consciousness and to many of the religious traditions encountered by ethnographers. The implications of a neurophenomenology for the anthropological study of consciousness are suggested.