Świadomość i jej intuicyjna niefizyczność

The intuition that phenomenal consciousness is not a physical property is central to debates about consciousness. Some theorists treat this intuition as a psychological illusion, while others see it as a genuine cognitive problem. This article argues that neither approach is satisfactory and presents a new argument that the intuition of dualism is a genuine epistemic problem. The difficulty arises because psychophysical identities cannot be deduced from physical truths alone, creating an epistemic gap that cannot be dismissed as mere error.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Explaining the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is not a physical property is crucial in the debate on the nature of consciousness. There are two competing strategies of how to approach this issue in the literature. Some assume that the intuition of dualism is a psychological illusion, others treat this intuition as a genuine cognitive problem which is not the result of an error. This article indicates the reasons for which the proposed theories of both types are not satisfactory and in addition articulates a new argument for the claim that the intuition of dualism is a genuine epistemic problem. The source of the problem lies in the fact that psychophysical identities are not deducible from physical truths.