Hallucinations and Phenomenal Consciousness

Hallucinations in schizophrenia may be understood as part of self-disturbances, arising from non-conscious low-level sensory anomalies and a disrupted perception-action cycle, rather than solely from problems of phenomenal consciousness. Historical phenomenological analyses by the Early Heidelberg School (1909–1932), particularly Mayer-Gross, who studied hypnagogic experiences, mescaline-induced model psychoses, and detailed accounts from people with schizophrenia, shaped this view. Debates with contemporaries led to the conclusion that hallucinations in schizophrenia relate to shifts in the organization of consciousness, later influencing Schneider's First Rank Symptoms. The chapter assesses how these early contributions inform current phenomenological understanding of hallucinations.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This chapter examines whether hallucinations are related to the problem of phenomenal consciousness and how historical contributions to the phenomenology of hallucinations, notably the Early Heidelberg School (1909–1932), shed light on hallucinations in schizophrenia. We focus specifically on Mayer-Gross, who in his phenomenological analysis of hallucinations during psychosis, drew from studies conducted with colleagues in Heidelberg: 1. Hypnagogic experiences (i.e., between waking and sleep); 2. Mescaline as a model-psychosis in the 1920’s with particular relationship to the self-disturbances; 3. Detailed accounts by persons with schizophrenia. In heated debates with colleagues (Berze, Jaspers, C. Schneider, Schröder, Specht, Wernicke) Mayer-Gross concluded that hallucinations in schizophrenia may be considered part of the self-disturbances (later contributing to K. Schneider’s First Rank Symptoms). Shifts in the organization of consciousness play a role. However, hallucinations develop from non-conscious low-level sensory anomalies and a disrupted perception action cycle. The chapter concludes with an assessment of how the Early Heidelberg School contributes to today’s phenomenology of hallucinations.