Prospects for the Scientific Study of Phenomenal Consciousness
Thinking about Consciousness April 25, 2002 DOI: 10.1093/0199243824.003.0008
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractMany scientists expect brain research to reveal the physical basis of conscious experience. However, Papineau contends that scientific investigation has limits when addressing the 'hard problem' of linking phenomenal concepts—our subjective experiences—to specific material states. Phenomenal concepts are inherently vague and do not point determinately to particular neural correlates. The chapter also examines Higher-Order Thought (HOT) and representational theories of consciousness, which offer alternative frameworks for understanding how mental states become conscious.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Phenomenal concepts are too vague to determinately identify specific material referents, limiting how far scientific research can resolve the hard problem of consciousness. |
Abstract
Abstract Many scientists hope that brain research will identify the material nature of conscious states. Papineau argues that when it comes to the “hard problem” of identifying the material referents of phenomenal concepts, scientific research can only take us so far. This is because phenomenal concepts are vague and do not point determinately to specific material states. This chapter also looks at Higher‐Order Thought (HOT) and representational accounts of consciousness.