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Cortical activity and the explanatory gap.

J G Taylor

Consciousness and cognition June 1, 1998 DOI: 10.1006/ccog.1998.0338 via PubMed

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

A theoretical paper examines how certain neural network features in the cerebral cortex might help bridge the explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and correlated brain activity. The authors propose criteria that neural activity must meet to be associated with phenomenal consciousness, review various neural processing styles, and identify one style—semiautonomous, long-lasting cortical activity "bubbles" triggered by input—as the best fit. Further experimental criteria narrow the candidate neural models, leading to a specific class of models and a set of testable predictions about the neural underpinnings of phenomenal consciousness.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 15
Key finding Semiautonomous, long-lasting cortical activity "bubbles" triggered by input are identified as the neural processing style most likely to underpin phenomenal consciousness.

Abstract

An exploration is given of neural network features now being uncovered in cortical processing which begins to go a little way to help bridge the "Explanatory Gap" between phenomenal consciousness and correlated brain activity. A survey of properties suggested as being possessed by phenomenal consciousness leads to a set of criteria to be required of the correlated neural activity. Various neural styles of processing are reviewed and those fitting the criteria are selected for further analysis. One particular processing style, in which semiautonomous and long-lasting cortical activity "bubbles" are created by input, is selected as being the most appropriate. Further experimental criteria are used to help narrow the possible neural styles involved. This leads to a class of neural models underpinning phenomenal consciousness and to a related set of testable predictions.

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