Closing in on the constitution of consciousness.

Consciousness science aims to find the neural basis of conscious experience, but a key problem is distinguishing neural correlates (brain activity that merely accompanies consciousness) from neural constitution (brain activity that actually generates consciousness). This paper reviews that distinction problem, arguing that current methods like recording, inhibition, and stimulation cannot reliably separate the two. The Jenga analogy illustrates why identifying minimal neural correlates is an insufficient goal. Even combined inhibition and stimulation strategies may reveal some constitutive activities but not the whole neural constitution. The author proposes new foundational claims for the field to address this challenge.

Study at a glance

Abstract

The science of consciousness is a nascent and thriving field of research that is founded on identifying the minimally sufficient neural correlates of consciousness. However, I have argued that it is the neural constitution of consciousness that science seeks to understand and that there are no evident strategies for distinguishing the correlates and constitution of (phenomenal) consciousness. Here I review this correlation/constitution distinction problem and challenge the existing foundations of consciousness science. I present the main analyses from a longer paper in press on this issue, focusing on recording, inhibition, stimulation, and combined inhibition/stimulation strategies, including proposal of the Jenga analogy to illustrate why identifying the minimally sufficient neural correlates of consciousness should not be considered the ultimate target of consciousness science. Thereafter I suggest that while combined inhibition and stimulation strategies might identify some constitutive neural activities-indeed minimally sufficient constitutive neural activities-such strategies fail to identify the whole neural constitution of consciousness and thus the correlation/constitution distinction problem is not fully solved. Various clarifications, potential objections and related scientific and philosophical issues are also discussed and I conclude by proposing new foundational claims for consciousness science.