Can self-representationalism explain away the apparent irreducibility of consciousness?

A self-representationalist (SR) theory of consciousness aims to explain both how conscious experience arises from brain processes and why consciousness misleadingly appears irreducible to the physical. This paper examines whether SR succeeds at the second task. The theory distinguishes subjective character (being conscious at all) from qualitative character (what it is like to be in a state). While SR plausibly explains why subjective character seems irreducible, it cannot explain why qualitative character also appears irreducible. The author concludes that a hybrid position combining SR with another account may be needed to fully address the apparent irreducibility of qualitative character.

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Abstract

Kriegel's self-representationalist (SR) theory of phenomenal consciousness pursues two projects. The first is to offer a positive account of how conscious experience arises from physical brain processes. The second is to explain why consciousness misleadingly appears to be irreducible to the physical i.e. to 'demystify' consciousness. This paper seeks to determine whether SR succeeds on the second project. Kriegel trades on a distinction between the subjective character and qualitative character of conscious states. Subjective character is the property of being a conscious state at all, while qualitative character determines what it is like to be in that state. Kriegel claims that SR explains why subjective character misleadingly appears irreducible, thereby neutralising the apparent irreducibility of consciousness. I argue that although SR credibly demystifies subjective character, it cannot explain why qualitative character also appears irreducible. I conclude that we should pursue the possibility of a hybrid position that combines SR with an account that does explain the apparent irreducibility of qualitative character.