The projective wave theory of consciousness.

Consciousness may arise from un-encoded information in an analogue model of 3-D space, specifically a wave excitation in the thalamus that stores information as a Fourier transform, similar to a hologram. Neurons couple to this wave, but the wave itself is the source of consciousness, not neural computation. The theory avoids the decoding problem inherent in neural theories, where encoded information requires external decoding not present in the brain. Although such a wave has not been detected, indirect evidence exists in the mammalian thalamus and insect central body. The theory is an initial conceptual outline, potentially falsifiable, and could explain why consciousness evolved, with many details remaining to be worked out.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Many theories of consciousness propose that consciousness arises from neural computation in the brain. All information in a neural computer is physically encoded, but consciousness contains un-encoded information about local space. The information required for decoding does not reside in the brain. So consciousness cannot arise from encoded neural information; but it could arise from un-encoded information, such as an analogue model of local 3-D space. This paper proposes that the mammalian brain holds an analogue model of 3-D space, as a wave excitation in the thalamus. The wave stores information in a Fourier transform of space, like a hologram. Neurons couple to the wave, and the wave is the source of consciousness. Such a wave has not been detected in the brain; but there are reasons why it has not yet been detected, and there are reasons for a wave to have evolved. There is indirect evidence for a wave in the mammalian thalamus, and in the central body of the insect brain. This paper is an initial conceptual outline of a projective wave theory of consciousness, in which phenomenal consciousness arises solely from a wave excitation in the thalamus. Neuronal activity maintains the wave, but has no direct link to consciousness. Such a theory is capable of agreeing well with the spatial form of our conscious experience. It avoids the decoding problem of neural theories of consciousness, and has the potential for a positive Bayesian balance between the complexity of its assumptions and the data it fits; this is reason to investigate it further. The theory would explain why consciousness evolved, and be falsifiable. Many details of the theory remain to be worked out.