Minds Matter

The claim that consciousness is necessary for a being to have a welfare—a view called phenomenalism—can take two forms: either consciousness is required for welfare subjecthood, or conscious beings have greater welfare capacity. The authors argue that hedonism, the most plausible source of support for either version, actually provides no support for phenomenalism. They instead discuss an alternative view, mentalism, which holds that welfare subjectivity and capacity depend on mentality more broadly, not specifically on consciousness.

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Abstract

Abstract Many claim that there is an important relationship between consciousness and welfare. Call this general view phenomenalism . One way of fleshing out phenomenalism is to hold that consciousness is what makes one the type of entity that can be noninstrumentally better or worse off in the first place. Consciousness is at least a necessary condition on welfare subjecthood . A different account holds that even if consciousness is not necessary for welfare subjecthood, conscious welfare subjects have a greater welfare capacity . We argue that the most likely source of support for either version of phenomenalism – hedonism about welfare goods and bads – provides no support at all. Along the way, we discuss an alternative view of welfare subjectivity and welfare capacity that does not appeal to consciousness but only to mentality, a view we call mentalism .