Dualism

Dualism and physicalism are both metaphysical views about consciousness, each grounded in a mix of empirical data and armchair reflection, not just one or the other. Contrary to a common misconception, dualists do not rely solely on conceptual analysis while physicalists lean exclusively on science. Both sides use empirical evidence and conceptual considerations, and both aim for positions that are consistent with but extend beyond scientific findings. This chapter corrects that misunderstanding by emphasizing the overlooked epistemic similarities between the two views.

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Abstract

Dualism is a metaphysical view about the nature of consciousness, driven largely by epistemic concerns. Dualism’s chief rival, physicalism about consciousness, is also a metaphysical view driven largely by epistemic concerns. A primary goal of this chapter is to correct a widespread misunderstanding about how epistemic issues shape the debate between dualists and physicalists. According to a familiar picture, dualism is motivated by armchair reflection, and dualists accord special significance to our ways of conceptualizing consciousness and the physical. In contrast, physicalists favor empirical data over armchair reflection, and physicalism is a relatively straightforward extension of scientific theorizing. This familiar picture is inaccurate. Both dualist and physicalist arguments employ a combination of empirical data and armchair reflection; both rely on considerations of how we conceptualize certain phenomena; and both aim to establish views that are compatible with scientific results but go well beyond the deliverances of empirical science. The discussion highlights these neglected epistemic parallels between dualism and physicalism.