How to Change Minds Ethically: Doxastic Vulnerability, Epistemic Harm Reduction, and the Role of Therapists in Psychedelic Therapy

Psychedelics can change minds by destabilizing the neurobiology of belief systems, raising ethical and epistemic concerns. This article argues for a skeptical attitude toward beliefs formed under psychedelic influence, contrasting with common epistemic practices in the field. It proposes four norms for ethically altering others' beliefs, based on outcomes and processes. The concept of 'doxastic vulnerability' describes heightened susceptibility to belief change, as induced by psychedelics. Placing people in this state creates responsibilities to prevent or mitigate harm, motivating epistemic harm reduction in psychedelic therapy. This supports a more active role for therapists as epistemic guides, contrary to recent calls for a passive non-directive stance.

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Abstract

ABSTRACT Psychedelics offer an intriguing novel method for changing minds, supposedly by destabilizing the neurobiology of the belief system. The resulting power to change minds raises ethical and epistemic concerns. This article examines the epistemic status of psychedelic experiences and suggests a skeptical attitude towards beliefs formed under their influence, a position that stands in contrast to some epistemic practices in the field. It proposes four norms for the ethics of altering beliefs and opinions of others, based on both the outcomes of interventions and the processes they involve. It introduces the concept of ‘doxastic vulnerability’ for states of heightened susceptibility to belief change, such as those induced by psychedelics. It further argues that placing people in a state of doxastic vulnerability generates responsibilities to prevent or mitigate harms arising from such states. This should motivate epistemic harm reduction measures in psychedelic therapy and, contrary to several recent statements in the literature, a reconsideration of a passive non‐directive stance of therapists in favor of a more active role as epistemic guides.