An integrative, multiscale view on neural theories of consciousness.

Consciousness may be explained by multiple, partly compatible theories rather than a single winner. A group of scientists representing different theories argue that various accounts often address different aspects or mechanistic levels of conscious experience, so they do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several theories may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be complementary, allowing multiple perspectives to simultaneously advance understanding. The authors advocate for unifying, integration-oriented approaches that combine valuable elements from diverse theories, an approach that has so far been largely neglected.

Study at a glance

Abstract

How is conscious experience related to material brain processes? A variety of theories aiming to answer this age-old question have emerged from the recent surge in consciousness research, and some are now hotly debated. Although most researchers have so far focused on the development and validation of their preferred theory in relative isolation, this article, written by a group of scientists representing different theories, takes an alternative approach. Noting that various theories often try to explain different aspects or mechanistic levels of consciousness, we argue that the theories do not necessarily contradict each other. Instead, several of them may converge on fundamental neuronal mechanisms and be partly compatible and complementary, so that multiple theories can simultaneously contribute to our understanding. Here, we consider unifying, integration-oriented approaches that have so far been largely neglected, seeking to combine valuable elements from various theories.