Consciousness in active inference: Deep self-models, other minds, and the challenge of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution.

A predictive processing account of consciousness is proposed, grounded in active inference, which holds that phenomenal consciousness arises from 'subjective valuation'—a deep inference about the precision of self-evidencing outcomes of action. The account aims to inform the attribution of consciousness to non-human systems via their deep self-models and sensory attenuation mechanisms. An objection from psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution states is considered; such states do not undermine the theory but instead corroborate subjective valuation as constitutive of experience, highlighting psychedelic research's potential for consciousness science and computational psychiatry.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Predictive processing approaches to brain function are increasingly delivering promise for illuminating the computational underpinnings of a wide range of phenomenological states. It remains unclear, however, whether predictive processing is equipped to accommodate a theory of consciousness itself. Furthermore, objectors have argued that without specification of the core computational mechanisms of consciousness, predictive processing is unable to inform the attribution of consciousness to other non-human (biological and artificial) systems. In this paper, I argue that an account of consciousness in the predictive brain is within reach via recent accounts of phenomenal self-modelling in the active inference framework. The central claim here is that phenomenal consciousness is underpinned by 'subjective valuation'-a deep inference about the precision or 'predictability' of the self-evidencing ('fitness-promoting') outcomes of action. Based on this account, I argue that this approach can critically inform the distribution of experience in other systems, paying particular attention to the complex sensory attenuation mechanisms associated with deep self-models. I then consider an objection to the account: several recent papers argue that theories of consciousness that invoke self-consciousness as constitutive or necessary for consciousness are undermined by states (or traits) of 'selflessness'; in particular the 'totally selfless' states of ego-dissolution occasioned by psychedelic drugs. Drawing on existing work that accounts for psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution in the active inference framework, I argue that these states do not threaten to undermine an active inference theory of consciousness. Instead, these accounts corroborate the view that subjective valuation is the constitutive facet of experience, and they highlight the potential of psychedelic research to inform consciousness science, computational psychiatry and computational phenomenology.